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Requirements: A paper of 1500 words (minimum word count—any paper more than 150 words short of this minimum will not be accepted as a complete paper). There is no maximum. You may use whatever citation format you wish (MLA, Chicago, etc.) but you MUST HAVE REFERENCES. There is no minimum or maximum number required, however. Prompt: Choose what you believe to be a paradigmatic conceptual framework in the history of science covered up to this point in the course. Your argument should refer to the specific stages and concepts Kuhn uses to describe paradigm shifts. (For example, what are some of the key anomalies of the previous paradigm? Which of these anomalies became critical anomalies? What were the specific crises these anomalies generated? How does the new paradigm deal with these?) Your argument should include the following: • why the framework is paradigmatic (i.e., why is it so fundamental that it rose to the level of a 'worldview'?) • how it evolved from the previous paradigm it replaced • specific historical examples of the paradigm’s evolution Microsoft Word - Kuhn_2.docx INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA of UNIFIED SCIENCE The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Second Edition, Enlarged Thomas S. Kuhn VOLUMES I AND II • FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNITY OF SCIENCE VOLUME II • NUMBER 2 International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Editor-in-Chief Otto Neurath Associate Editors Rudolf Carnap Charles Morris Foundations of the Unity of Science (Volumes I—II of the Encyclopedia) Committee of Organization RUDOLF CARNAP CHARLES MORRIS PHILIPP FRANK OTTO NEURATH JOERGEN JOERGENSEN LOUIS ROUGIER Advisory Committee NIELS BOHR R. VON MISES EGON BRUNSWIK G. MANNOURY J. CLAY ERNEST NAGEL JOHN DEWEY ARNE NAESS FEDERIGO ENRIQUES HANS REICHENBACH HERBERT FEIGL ABEL REY CLARK L. HULL BERTRAND RUSSELL WALDEMAR KAEMPFFERT L. SUSAN STEBBING VICTOR F. LENZEN ALFRED TARSKI JAN LUKASIEWICZ EDWARD C. TOLMAN WILLIAM M. MALISOFF JOSEPH H. WOODGER THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 60637 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, LTD., LONDON © 1962, 1970 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Published 1962. Second Edition, enlarged, 1970 Printed in the United States of America 81 80 79 78 11 10 9 8 ISBN: 0-226-45803-2 (clothbound); 0-226-45804-0 (paperbound) Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 79-107472 International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Volume 2 • Number 2 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas S. Kuhn Contents: PREFACE ...................................................... v I. INTRODUCTION: A ROLE FOR HISTORY ............ 1 II. THE ROUTE TO NORMAL SCIENCE .................... 10 III. THE NATURE OF NORMAL SCIENCE ................. 23 IV. NORMAL SCIENCE AS PUZZLE-SOLVING ........... 35 V. THE PRIORITY OF PARADIGMS .......................... 43 VI. ANOMALY AND THE EMERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES 52 VII. CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 66 VIII. THE RESPONSE TO CRISIS ................................. 77 IX. THE NATURE AND NECESSITY OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 92 X. REVOLUTIONS AS CHANGES OF WORLD VIEW ...... 111 XI. THE INVISIBILITY OF REVOLUTIONS ................. 136 XII. THE RESOLUTION OF REVOLUTIONS ................ 144 XIII. PROGRESS THROUGH REVOLUTIONS ................ 160 Postscript-1969 ................................................ 174 iii Preface The essay that follows is the first full published report on a project originally conceived almost fifteen years ago. At that time I was a graduate student in theoretical physics already within sight of the end of my dissertation. A fortunate involvement with an experimental college course treating physical science for the non-scientist provided my first exposure to the history of science. To my complete surprise, that exposure to out-of-date scientific theory and practice radically undermined some of my basic conceptions about the nature of science and the reasons for its special success. Those conceptions were ones I had previously drawn partly from scientific training itself and partly from a long-standing avocational interest in the philosophy of science. Somehow, whatever their pedagogic utility and their abstract plausibility, those notions did not at all fit the enterprise that historical study displayed. Yet they were and are fundamental to many discussions of science, and their failures of verisimilitude therefore seemed thoroughly worth pursuing. The result was a drastic shift in my career plans, a shift from physics to history of science and then, gradually, from relatively straightforward historical problems back to the more philosophical concerns that had initially led me to history. Except for a few articles, this essay is the first of my published works in which these early concerns are dominant. In some part it is an attempt to explain to myself and to friends how I happened to be drawn from science to its history in the first place. My first opportunity to pursue in depth some of the ideas set forth below was provided by three years as a Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows of Harvard University. Without that period of freedom the transition to a new field of study would have been far more difficult and might not have been achieved. Part of my time in those years was devoted to history of science proper. In particular I continued to study the writings of Alex- Vol. II, No. 2 v Preface andre Koyré and first encountered those of Emile Meyerson, Hélène Metzger, and Anneliese Maier.1 More clearly than most other recent scholars, this group has shown what it was like to think scientifically in a period when the canons of scientific thought were very different from those current today. Though I increasingly question a few of their particular historical interpretations, their works, together with A. O. Lovejoy’s Great Chain of Being, have been second only to primary source materials in shaping my conception of what the history of scientific ideas can be. Much of my time in those years, however, was spent exploring fields without apparent relation to history of science but in which research now discloses problems like the ones history was bringing to my attention. A footnote encountered by chance led me to the experiments by which Jean Piaget has illuminated both the various worlds of the growing child and the process of transition from one to the next.2 One of my colleagues set me to reading papers in the psychology of perception, particularly the Gestalt psychologists; another introduced me to B. L. Whorf’s speculations about the effect of language on world view; and W. V. O. Quine opened for me the philosophical puzzles of the analytic- synthetic distinction.3 That is the sort of random exploration that the Society of Fellows permits, and only through it could I have encountered Ludwik Fleck’s almost unknown monograph, Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wis- 1 Particularly influential were Alexandre Koyré, Études Galiléennes (3 vols.; Paris, 1939); Emile Meyerson, Identity and Reality, trans. Kate Loewenberg (New York, 1930); Hélène Metzger, Les doctrines chimiques en France du début du XVIIe à la fin du XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1923), and Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique (Paris, 1930); and Anneliese Maier, Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert (“Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik”; Rome, 1949). 2 Because they displayed concepts and processes that also emerge directly from the history of science, two sets of Piaget s investigations proved particularly important: The Child’s Conception of Causality, trans. Marjorie Gabain (London, 1930), and Les notions de mouvement et de vitesse