Answer To: Week 8: Basic concepts in game theory Part 1: Examples of games We introduce here the basic objects...
Robert answered on Dec 22 2021
Weak 8:
Answer to exercise 1:
Two options: pay and not pay
If both of them pay, each will contribute $15 and have the payoff of $25 (=40-15).
If no one pays, each will receive zero payoffs.
If one pay and the other does’t, then the one who contribute will receive a payoff of $10 (=40-
30) and the one who does not contribute will receive payoff of $40.
The payoff matrix can be represented as follows;
Chelsea
Pay Not pay
Robert
Pay 25, 25 10, 40
Not pay 40, 10 0, 0
The following game has two Nash equilibriums: one in which Robert pays the fee but Chelsea
does not and the other in which Robert does not pay but Chelsea pays i.e.
(pay, not pay) and (not pay, pay)
Answer to exercise 2:
Two options with Robert: fair split (60-40), unequal split (85-15)
Two options with Chelsea: accepting any offer or accepting only the fair offer.
The payoff matrix can be represented as follows:
Chelsea
Accept any offer Accepting only the fair offer
Robert
Fair Split 60, 40 60, 40
Unequal Split 85, 15 0, 0
The game has two Nash equilibriums; the one in which Robert offer an unequal split and Chelsea
accepts, and the other in which Robert offer fair split and Chelsea accepts i.e.
(Unequal split, accept any offer) and (fair split, accepting only the fair offer)
Answer to exercise 3:
Player B
R S P
Player
A
R 73, 25 57, 42 66, 32
S 80, 26 35, 12 32, 54
P 28, 27 63, 31 54, 29
Under iteratively eliminating dominated strategies (IEDS), we eliminate the strictly dominated
strategy. A strategy is called strictly dominated if payoff associated with that strategy is strictly
less than payoffs associated with any other strategy of the player.
We note that for player B, payoffs associated with his strategy P are strictly greater than his
payoffs associated with strategy R. This means strategy P of player B strictly dominate his
strategy R. So under IEDS, we will eliminate the strategy R. After this elimination, the resulting
matrix would be:
Player B
S P
Player
A
R 57, 42 66, 32
S 35, 12 32, 54
P 63, 31 54, 29
We now note that strategy S of player A is strictly dominated by his strategy R. So under IEDS,
we will eliminate strategy S and the resulting matrix would be:
Player B
S P
Player
A
R 57, 42 66, 32
P 63, 31 54, 29
In this reduced matrix, we note that strategy P of player B is strictly dominated by his strategy S.
Hence we would eliminate strategy P of player B and the resulting matrix would be:
Player
B
S
Player
A
R 57, 42
P 63, 31
In this reduced matrix, we note that strategy P of player A strictly dominates his own strategy R.
This means under Nash equilibrium, player A would never play strategy ‘R’ and therefore the
strategy profile (P, S) would be the Nash equilibrium of the following game.
Answer to exercise 4:
Ten players; 1,2,3,……….,10
Spending by country i: xi, where 0 xi 1
Total...