Week 8: Basic concepts in game theory Part 1: Examples of games We introduce here the basic objects involved in game theory. To specify a game ones gives The players. The set of all possible...

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Week 8: Basic concepts in game theory Part 1: Examples of games We introduce here the basic objects involved in game theory. To specify a game ones gives The players. The set of all possible strategies for each player. The payos: if each player Week 8: Basic concepts in game theoryPart 1: Examples of gamesWe introduce here the basic objects involved in game theory. To specify a game onesgives•Theplayers.•The set of all possiblestrategiesfor each player.•Thepayoffs: if each player picks a certain strategy then each player receive a payoffrepresented by a number. The payoff for every player depends, in general, fromthe strategies of all other players. Payoffs have many different meanings, e.g., anamount of money, a number of years of happiness, the fitness in biology, etc... Ourconvention is that the highest payoff is deemed the most desirable one.In the rest of this section we introduce some of the standard games in game theory,together with the ”story behind them”The prisoner’s dilemma:. This is one of the most famous game in game theory. Onepossible story associated to it goes as follows. A prosecutor seeks two arrest two bankrobbers. He lacks proofs of their involvement in the heist but has managed to have themarrested for a minor fraud charge. He offers to each them the following choices. If youconfess but your accomplice does not then you will go free and your accomplice will bepunished 8 years in jail. If you both confess then you will each get 6 years in jail. Finally,if none confess then they both will convicted for the minor fraud charge, say for 1 year inprison.We will represent payoffs and strategies using a table. We will call the player Robert(R is for the ”row” player) and Collin (C is for ”column” player). For both Robert andCollin the strategies are confess or not confess.RobertCollinconfessnot confessconfess-6-6-80not confess-6-8-1-11 The rows represents the strategies of Robert, the columns the strategies of Collin. Thenumerical entries are understood as follows: in each box the lower left entry is the payofffor Robert while the the upper right entry is the payoff for Collin.Solution of the prisoner’s dilemma:To see what is the best option for the prisoner’sdilemma one observes that if your accomplice confess then it is better for you to confess(8 years in jails) rather than not confessing (10 years in jail). On the other hand if youraccomplice does not confess it is better for you to confess (0 years in jails) rather than notconfessing (1 years in jail). Therefore the outcome of the game is that rational playerswill both confess and end in jail for 8 years. We will see later that the pairs of strategies”confess” and ”confess” is an equilibrium for this game. The ”dilemma” here is that ifboth do not confess they would get both 1 year in jail instead of 8 years, a much morepreferable outcome for both! However without communication between the players, thereis no mechanism to enforce this.Duopoly:A strategic situation similar to the prisoner’s dilemma occurs in many differentcontexts. Imagine for example two countries who produce oil and each can choose betweenproducing 2 millions barrels/day or 4 millions barrels/day. The total output will be then4, 6, or 8 millions barrels/day and the corresponding price will be $20, $12, $7 per barrel( a decreasing price reflects basic law of supply and demand). The payoff table is givenbyCountry ACountry B2 million4 million2 million404048244 million24482828Analyzing the game as in the prisoner’s dilemma one finds that the best strategy is toproduce $4 million per day because it leads to a higher revenue no matter what the othercountry does. This is of course in many ways a socially bad outcome since it leads towasting a precious resource and lower revenue for the oil producing countries.Battle of the sexes:Robert and Chelsea are planning an event of entertainment. Aboveall they value spending time together but Robert likes to go to the game while Chelseaprefers to go to the ballet. They both need to decide what to do tonight without commu-nicating with each other. To produce a numerical outcome we assume that the value 1 isgiven to having your favorite entertainment while a value 2 is assigned to being together.This leads to2
Answered Same DayDec 22, 2021

Answer To: Week 8: Basic concepts in game theory Part 1: Examples of games We introduce here the basic objects...

Robert answered on Dec 22 2021
124 Votes
Weak 8:
Answer to exercise 1:
Two options: pay and not pay
If both of them pay, each will contribute $15 and have the payoff of $25 (=40-15).
If no one pays, each will receive zero payoffs.
If one pay and the other does’t, then the one who contribute will receive a payoff of $10 (=40-
30)
and the one who does not contribute will receive payoff of $40.
The payoff matrix can be represented as follows;

Chelsea

Pay Not pay
Robert
Pay 25, 25 10, 40
Not pay 40, 10 0, 0

The following game has two Nash equilibriums: one in which Robert pays the fee but Chelsea
does not and the other in which Robert does not pay but Chelsea pays i.e.
(pay, not pay) and (not pay, pay)
Answer to exercise 2:
Two options with Robert: fair split (60-40), unequal split (85-15)
Two options with Chelsea: accepting any offer or accepting only the fair offer.
The payoff matrix can be represented as follows:

Chelsea

Accept any offer Accepting only the fair offer
Robert
Fair Split 60, 40 60, 40
Unequal Split 85, 15 0, 0

The game has two Nash equilibriums; the one in which Robert offer an unequal split and Chelsea
accepts, and the other in which Robert offer fair split and Chelsea accepts i.e.
(Unequal split, accept any offer) and (fair split, accepting only the fair offer)
Answer to exercise 3:

Player B

R S P
Player
A
R 73, 25 57, 42 66, 32
S 80, 26 35, 12 32, 54
P 28, 27 63, 31 54, 29
Under iteratively eliminating dominated strategies (IEDS), we eliminate the strictly dominated
strategy. A strategy is called strictly dominated if payoff associated with that strategy is strictly
less than payoffs associated with any other strategy of the player.
We note that for player B, payoffs associated with his strategy P are strictly greater than his
payoffs associated with strategy R. This means strategy P of player B strictly dominate his
strategy R. So under IEDS, we will eliminate the strategy R. After this elimination, the resulting
matrix would be:

Player B

S P
Player
A
R 57, 42 66, 32
S 35, 12 32, 54
P 63, 31 54, 29
We now note that strategy S of player A is strictly dominated by his strategy R. So under IEDS,
we will eliminate strategy S and the resulting matrix would be:

Player B

S P
Player
A
R 57, 42 66, 32
P 63, 31 54, 29
In this reduced matrix, we note that strategy P of player B is strictly dominated by his strategy S.
Hence we would eliminate strategy P of player B and the resulting matrix would be:
Player
B

S
Player
A
R 57, 42
P 63, 31

In this reduced matrix, we note that strategy P of player A strictly dominates his own strategy R.
This means under Nash equilibrium, player A would never play strategy ‘R’ and therefore the
strategy profile (P, S) would be the Nash equilibrium of the following game.
Answer to exercise 4:
Ten players; 1,2,3,……….,10
Spending by country i: xi, where 0 xi 1
Total...
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