Two players bargain over $20. They proceed as follows. Player 1 first proposes a split(n; 20-n); where n is an integer in {0, 1,.... 20 }. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player...

Two players bargain over $20. They proceed as follows. Player 1 first proposes a split(n; 20-n); where n is an integer in {0, 1,.... 20 }. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player 1 accepts it, player 1 obtains $n and player 2 obtains $(20-n)  If player 2 rejects it, the money is taken away from them and both players will get $0

Find two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and state clearly each player's equilibrium strategies (recall that in a dynamic game, a player's strategy is a complete-contingent plan). Explain why the strategy profiles form a subgame perfect equilibrium.