Twice Repeated 3 3 Bimatrix Games Consider the following bimatrix game: Suppose that the game is played twice, and that after the first play of the game the players learn the outcome of that play. The...

Twice Repeated 33 Bimatrix Games

Consider the following bimatrix game:

Suppose that the game is played twice, and that after the first play of the game the players learn the outcome of that play. The final payoff for each player is the sum of the payoffs of the two stages.

(a) How many strategies does each player have in this game? How many subgames does the game have?

(b) Describe a subgame perfect equilibrium in which .T; L/ is played in the first round.

For question (c), consider the bimatrix game

(c) For the twice repeated version of this game, describe a subgame perfect equilibrium in which .B; R/ is played in the first round.