this is a 400 word review on a chapterthe main point of the second paragraph is to link it back the larger picture of the unit
Paragraph 1: main argument (and how it is supported – evidence etc) 150-200 words Paragraph 2 (150-200 words) : Relating it to the context. Show the reader what the contribution of the article/chapter is to the broader scholarship. · How does this article allow us to understand violence/crime/protest in Asia? · Why it is useful? How is it different? How is it the same? · What does it tell us we didn’t know before ? · Does that make us think differently / new understanding about violence/crime/protest/underside? Ideas that can be discussed in the review: · How is crime/violence/protest described in this article? What role does it play? Is it central, or peripheral? · Does the article focus on what prompts it, or its manifestation, or what its outcomes are? Why? · Does the article focus on agents, or victims? Are these interchangeable or not? Why? · Does the article connect violence/crime/protest to particular institutions/cultural forms/events? · How do the authors themselves reflect on their contribution to scholarship? Do they make a point about their own contribution to scholarship and is it about these topics or about something else? · Is there a comparison or a contrast you can make to an earlier article, or a concept that was discussed in the lesson in week 2? For example does it match with the WHO’s definition of violence? · Is there any moralising going on in the article? Why? Do you think that is appropriate? (It can be – don’t reject out of hand, just think about what it means) Paragraph 1: main argument (and how it is supported – evidence etc) 150-200 words Paragraph 2 (150-200 words) : Relating it to the context. Show the reader what the contribution of the article/chapter is to the broader scholarship. · How does this article allow us to understand violence/crime/protest in Asia? · Why it is useful? How is it different? How is it the same? · What does it tell us we didn’t know before ? · Does that make us think differently / new understanding about violence/crime/protest/underside? Ideas that can be discussed in the review: · How is crime/violence/protest described in this article? What role does it play? Is it central, or peripheral? · Does the article focus on what prompts it, or its manifestation, or what its outcomes are? Why? · Does the article focus on agents, or victims? Are these interchangeable or not? Why? · Does the article connect violence/crime/protest to particular institutions/cultural forms/events? · How do the authors themselves reflect on their contribution to scholarship? Do they make a point about their own contribution to scholarship and is it about these topics or about something else? · Is there a comparison or a contrast you can make to an earlier article, or a concept that was discussed in the lesson in week 2? For example does it match with the WHO’s definition of violence? · Is there any moralising going on in the article? Why? Do you think that is appropriate? (It can be – don’t reject out of hand, just think about what it means) someTitle 4 CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE TRIPLE DISASTERS Revealed strengths and weaknesses Kawato Yūko, Robert Pekkanen, and Tsujinaka Yutaka1 The triple disasters—9.0 earthquake centered in Tōhoku, the massive accompanying tsunami, and the Fukushima nuclear accident—that rocked Japan on March 11, 2011 tested the country as nothing has since the end of World War II. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of Japan’s civil society were on display during the crisis. The vitality of Japan’s local civil society groups greatly mitigated the painful eff ects of the triple disasters, and there can be no doubt that many owe their lives to these groups, directly or indirectly. At the same time, the inability over many years of civil society groups to act as eff ective monitors or checks on state action also arguably contributed to the magnitude of the nuclear catastrophe, by failing to spur improvements in safety practices. We understand civil society to be the organized non-state, non-market sector that exists above the family and individual. This includes nonprofi t organizations (NPOs) as well as community groups like neighborhood associations and volunteer fi refi ghter groups. On one hand, activities of community groups before the disaster improved preparedness and created social capital that facilitated the response to the disaster. NPOs outside of the aff ected area had developed expertise through past disasters and rushed to provide relief. On the other hand, a weak advocacy role of civil society in Japan may have been a contributing factor in the nuclear disaster by providing an ineff ectual check on an errant nuclear industry. The state and electric power companies closely collaborated to implement an expansive nuclear energy policy while marginalizing civil society in their decision-making. The state and power companies also off er signifi cant compensation to local communities that accept nuclear plants, making local advocacy and protest mobilization diffi cult. The confi guration of Japan’s civil society and its relationship to the policy-making process hampered eff ective contestation of nuclear policy. This chapter fi rst describes the general characteristics of Japan’s civil society to explain why civil society organizations could not act as eff ective watchdogs to help Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan : Response and Recovery after Japan's 3/11, edited by Jeff Kingston, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/monash/detail.action?docID=957051. Created from monash on 2022-05-08 11:40:14. C op yr ig ht © 2 01 2. T ay lo r & F ra nc is G ro up . A ll rig ht s re se rv ed . Civil society and the triple disasters 79 prevent the nuclear accident. Second, we will discuss how community organizations provided a strong foundation for immediate response to the earthquake and tsunami. We will also highlight the activities of NPOs from outside Tōhoku. This chapter concludes with a discussion about how the general characteristics of NPOs are likely to shape their participation in the recovery eff orts, and how NPO response to the disaster will (or will not) change policy and policy-making process in the future. Japan’s civil society In comparative perspective, most civil society organizations in Japan are small, local organizations.2 They have four defi ning characteristics. First, they have small membership. According to the Cabinet Offi ce’s survey of 2,345 NPOs in 2010, 67 percent of the NPOs had less than 20 members, and only 11 percent had more than 100 members. Second, most NPOs have a small number of professional staff . In the aforementioned survey, 50 percent of the NPOs said they had less than 20 staff . Third, most organizations have small budgets. The survey showed that in the previous year 54 percent of the NPOs had income of less than ¥10 million (about $123,000), while only 13 percent had income of more than ¥50 million ($616,000). Finally, most organizations have a small area of operation. Thirty-nine percent of the NPOs responded that they engage in activities within one city, town, or village, and 40 percent said they work in multiple communities within one prefecture. Only 7 percent engaged in nationwide activities (Cabinet Offi ce 2011: 3–7). Many small local groups, and a few large professional advocacy groups, make up Japan’s civil society. There are four main reasons for this. First, beginning with the Civil Code of 1896, the state has encouraged the growth of organizations that serve the “public interest,” instead of advocacy organizations that challenge the state and its policies (Pekkanen 2006). The Special Nonprofi t Organization Law of 1998 liberalized the conditions under which NPOs could form and operate, but this law did not lead to a fundamental change in the type of organizations that compose Japan’s civil society or the state-civil society relationship (Kawato and Pekkanen 2008). Legal status is easier for many groups to acquire, but government red tape continues to handcuff groups. Onerous reporting requirements and the limitations on charging for overheads hamper the growth of nonprofi t organizations in the country. The reporting requirements vary by organization, but it might be surprising for the American reader to know just how time-consuming they are. For example, even an organization that employs a very small number of staff might have to devote six months of one staff person’s time to completing just the annual reporting duties. This burden is compounded by the fact that many Japanese government contracts do not permit the charging of overheads by the organization, paying only for actual project work. Second, most NPOs remain local and small because they have few opportunities to participate in policy-making at the national level, except for some organizations Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan : Response and Recovery after Japan's 3/11, edited by Jeff Kingston, Taylor & Francis Group, 2012. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/monash/detail.action?docID=957051. Created from monash on 2022-05-08 11:40:14. C op yr ig ht © 2 01 2. T ay lo r & F ra nc is G ro up . A ll rig ht s re se rv ed . 80 Kawato Yūko et al. that work closely with the state (Tsujinaka 2002; Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007). According to Pharr (1990), the limited access reduces civil society organizations’ incentive to increase staff and other organizational resources for advocacy. Furthermore, a relatively greater access to local governments has reinforced NPOs’ tendency to work locally. Third, many organizations remain small and local because they are short of funds. A series of reforms in the last decade has enabled individuals and corporations to obtain tax privileges for donating to NPOs with special certifi cation from the National Tax Agency, including a major revision in June 2011. However, the number of certifi ed NPOs is still vanishingly small at 223 out of over 42,000 (0.5 percent) and donations remain only a minor portion of organizational revenue on average. In addition, the state prioritizes funding to organizations that it considers important, like social welfare corporations and cannot fund all organizations that wish to receive funding. Private foundations have not been an important source of funding for NPOs. Corporate foundations that tend to be politically and socially conservative are not enthusiastic about funding advocacy organizations either (Reimann 2010: Ch. 2). With limited funding, NPOs face challenges in expanding membership,