Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to...

Extracted text: Table 17-1 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Celia and Venya, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Celia and Venya work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring the water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Celia and Venya can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The town's weekly demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the following table: Quantity Price Total Revenue and Total Profit (Gallons) (Dollars per gallon) (Dollars) 36 33 30 27 24 21 40 1,320 2,400 3.240 3,840 4,200 4,320 4,200 3,840 3,240 2,400 1,320 80 120 160 200 240 18 280 15 320 12 360 400 6. 3 440 480 Refer to Table 17-1. Suppose the town enacts new antitrust laws that prohibit Celia and Venya from operating as a monopoly. What will be the price of water once Celia and Venya reach a Nash equilibrium? O a. $12 O b. $15 O. $9 O d. $18 TTTTII||||