Suppose two firms compete as Cournot Oligopolists. The profit functions of these two firms are п — (150 — q —92)91 — 209, T2 = (150 – 91 – 92)92 – 2292 Which generate the following best response...

option c

Extracted text: Suppose two firms compete as Cournot Oligopolists. The profit functions of these two firms are п — (150 — q —92)91 — 209, T2 = (150 – 91 – 92)92 – 2292 Which generate the following best response functions. 150 – 20 1 91 = 2 150 – 20 1 92 = 2 a. Plot these reaction functions in a graph with q, on the horizontal axis and q, on the vertical axis. b. Derive, I want to see your work, the Nash equilibrium outcome of this game. c. How does the Nash equilibrium change if the demand curve shifts out, a bigger intercept on the demand equation.