SuperJ and DuperJ manufacture turbine generators and decide simultaneously whether tocharge a low price PL or a high price PH for their products. If both firms charge PL, theymake a profit of $80m. If...

SuperJ and DuperJ manufacture turbine generators and decide simultaneously whether tocharge a low price PL or a high price PH for their products. If both firms charge PL, theymake a profit of $80m. If both firms charge PH, they make a profit of $100m. When the twofirms charge different prices, the firm charging PL makes a profit of $140m, while the firmcharging PH makes a profit of $25m.a (2). Provide the normal-form representation of the game.b (2). Is there a dominant strategy for SuperJ?c (2). Is there a dominant strategy for DuperJ?d (4). Find the Nash equilibria of the game.