Section 4.A of this chapter discussed mixing in the battle-of-the-sexes game between Harry and Sally. (a) What do you expect to happen to the equilibrium values of p and q found in the chapter if...

Section 4.A of this chapter discussed mixing in the battle-of-the-sexes game between Harry and Sally.

(a) What do you expect to happen to the equilibrium values of p and q found in the chapter if Sally decides she really likes Local Latte a lot more than Starbucks, so that the payoffs in the (Local Latte, Local Latte) cell are now (1, 3)? Explain your reasoning.

(b) Now find the new mixed-strategy equilibrium values of p and q. How do they compare with those of the original game?

(c) What is the expected payoff to each player in the new mixed-strategy equilibrium?

(d) Do you think Harry and Sally might play the mixed-strategy equilibrium in this new version of the game? Explain why or why not.