Sarah Chang is the owner of a small electronics company. In 6 months, a proposal is due for an electronic timing system for the next Olympic Games. For several years, Chang’s company has been...

Sarah Chang is the owner of a small electronics company. In 6 months, a proposal is due for an electronic timing system for the next Olympic Games. For several years, Chang’s company has been developing a new microprocessor, a critical component in a timing system that would be superior to any product currently on the market. However, progress in research and development has been slow, and Chang is unsure about whether her staff can produce the microprocessor in time. If they succeed in developing the microprocessor (probability p₁), there is an excellent chance (probability p₂) that Chang’s company will win the $1 million Olympic contract. If they do not, there is a small chance (probability p₃) that she will still be able to win the same contract with an alternative, inferior timing system that has already been developed. If she continues the project, Chang must invest $200,000 in research and development. In addition, making a proposal (which she will decide whether to do after seeing whether the R&D is successful or not) requires developing a prototype timing system at an additional cost. This additional cost is $50,000 if R&D is successful (so that she can develop the new timing system), and it is $40,000 if R&D is unsuccessful (so that she needs to go with the older timing system). Finally, if Chang wins the contract, the finished product will cost an additional $150,000 to produce.


a.  Develop a decision tree that can be used to solve Chang’s problem. You can assume in this part of the problem that she is using EMV (of her net profit) as a decision criterion. Build the tree so that she can enter any values for p₁, p₂, and p₃
(in input cells) and automatically see her optimal EMV and optimal strategy from the tree.

b. If p₂
= 0.8 and p₃= 0.1, what value of p₁
makes Chang indifferent between abandoning the project and going ahead with it?

c. How much would Chang be willing to pay the Olympic organization (now) to guarantee her the contract in the case where her company is successful in developing the contract? (This guarantee is in force only if she is successful in developing the product.) Assume p₁= 0.4, p₂
= 0.8, and p₃= 0.1.


d. Suppose now that this a “big” project for Chang. Therefore, she decides to use expected utility as her criterion, with an exponential utility function. Using some trial and error, see which risk tolerance changes her initial decision from “go ahead” to “abandon” when p₁= 0.4, p₂= 0.8, and p₃= 0.1.