Q4. Consider the following game A В А (, 6) (0, 8) в (), 2) (4, 0) (a). Does this game have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? (b). Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. What are the payoffs...

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Extracted text: Q4. Consider the following game A В А (, 6) (0, 8) в (), 2) (4, 0) (a). Does this game have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? (b). Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. What are the payoffs to agents form the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium? (c). Suppose that the game is repeated 27 times and agents discount the future according to discount factor 8. Find all subgame perfect equilibria of the game. (Hint: Proposition 1 in the "Repeated Games" notes is still valid)