Q2 GSP vs. Vickrey Consider a standard position auction. There are three positions: Top (T), Middle (M) and Bottom (B). Position T receives xT = position B receives xB dollar values per click: v1 150...

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Extracted text: Q2 GSP vs. Vickrey Consider a standard position auction. There are three positions: Top (T), Middle (M) and Bottom (B). Position T receives xT = position B receives xB dollar values per click: v1 150 clicks per day, position M receives xM = 100 and 50 clicks per day. There are five bidders (B1-B5) with the following 12, v2 = 10, v3 = 7, v4 = 5, v5 = 3. %D (a) Verify whether bidding your value will be an equilibrium of the GSP auction (Google). (b) Find an equilibrium of the GSP auction (Google) with the maximum revenue. (c) Find an equilibrium of the GSP auction (Google) with the minimum revenue. (d) Find the equilibrium of the Vickrey auction (Facebook). Calculate auction revenue.