Please, write a main discussion post about the below topic:
Refer to the “Debate this Question” in the Review section at the end of Chapter 13. attached .Specifically: “Courts should not be able to decide on the adequacy of consideration.” Decide if you agree or disagree. State your reasoning. Support your response with detailed information from the chapters.
(Citations needed for main post)
Instructions for main post (Around 200 words) Please, write a main discussion post about the below topic: Refer to the “Debate this Question” in the Review section at the end of Chapter 13. Specifically: “Courts should not be able to decide on the adequacy of consideration.” Decide if you agree or disagree. State your reasoning. Support your response with detailed information from the chapters. (Citations needed for main post) Chapter 13 13–1a Legally Sufficient Value To be legally sufficient, consideration must be something of value in the eyes of the law. The “something of legally sufficient value” may consist of the following: 1. A promise to do something that one has no prior legal duty to do. 2. The performance of an action that one is otherwise not obligated to undertake. 3. The refraining from an action that one has a legal right to undertake (called a forbeance) Consideration in bilateral contracts normally consists of a promise in return for a promise. In a contract for the sale of goods, for instance, the seller promises to ship specific goods to the buyer, and the buyer promises to pay for those goods. Each of these promises constitutes consideration for the contract. In contrast, unilateral contracts involve a promise in return for a performance (an action). Example 13.1 Anita says to her neighbor, “When you finish painting the garage, I will pay you $800.” Anita’s neighbor paints the garage. The act of painting the garage is the consideration that creates Anita’s contractual obligation to pay her neighbor $800. Exhibit 13–1Consideration in Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts What if, in return for a promise to pay, a person refrains from pursuing harmful habits (a forbearance), such as the use of tobacco and alcohol? Does such forbearance constitute legally sufficient consideration? This was the issue before the court in the following classic case concerning consideration. Classic Case 13.1 Hamer v. Sidway Court of Appeals of New York, Second Division, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891). Background and Facts William E. Story, Sr., was the uncle of William E. Story II. In the presence of family members and others, the uncle promised to pay his nephew $5,000 ($76,000 in today’s dollars) if he would refrain from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until he reached the age of twenty-one. (Note that in 1869, when this contract was formed, it was legal in New York to drink and play cards for money before the age of twenty-one.) The nephew agreed and fully performed his part of the bargain. When he reached the age of twenty-one, he wrote and told his uncle that he had kept his part of the agreement and was therefore entitled to $5,000. The uncle wrote a letter back indicating that he was pleased with his nephew’s performance and saying “you shall have five thousand dollars, as I promised you.” The uncle also said that the $5,000 was in the bank and that the nephew could “consider this money on interest.” The nephew left the $5,000 in the care of his uncle, where it would earn interest under the terms and conditions of the letter. The uncle died about twelve years later without having paid his nephew any part of the $5,000 and interest. The executor of the uncle’s estate (Sidway, the defendant in this action) claimed that there had been no valid consideration for the promise. Sidway refused to pay the $5,000 (plus interest) to Hamer, a third party to whom the nephew had transferred his rights in the note. The court reviewed the case to determine whether the nephew had given valid consideration under the law. In the Language of the Court PARKER, J. [Justice] * * * * * * * Courts will not ask whether the thing which forms the consideration does in fact benefit the promisee or a third party, or is of any substantial value to any one. It is enough that something is promised, done, forborne, or suffered by the party to whom the promise is made as consideration for the promise made to him. In general a waiver of any legal right at the request of another party is a sufficient consideration for a promise. Any damage, or suspension, or forbearance of a right will be sufficient to sustain a promise. * * * Now, applying this rule to the facts before us, the promisee used tobacco, occasionally drank liquor, and he had a legal right to do so. That right he abandoned for a period of years upon the strength of the promise of the testator [his uncle] that for such forbearance he would give him $5,000. We need not speculate on the effort which may have been required to give up the use of those stimulants. It is sufficient that he restricted his lawful freedom of action within certain prescribed limits upon the faith of his uncle’s agreement * * *. [Emphasis added.] Impact of This Case on Today’s Law Although this case was decided more than a century ago, the principles enunciated by the court remain applicable to contracts formed today, including online contracts. For a contract to be valid and binding, consideration must be given, and that consideration must be something of legally sufficient value. 13–1b Bargained-for Exchange The second element of consideration is that it must provide the basis for the bargain struck between the contracting parties. That is, the item of value must be given or promised by the promisor (offeror) in return for the promisee’s promise, performance, or promise of performance. This element of bargained-for exchange distinguishes contracts from gifts. Example 13.2 Sheng-Li says to his son, “In consideration of the fact that you are not as wealthy as your brothers, I will pay you $5,000.” The fact that the word consideration is used does not, by itself, mean that consideration has been given. Indeed, Sheng-Li’s promise is not enforceable, because the son does not have to do anything in order to receive the $5,000 promised. Because the son does not need to give Sheng-Li something of legal value in return for his promise, there is no bargained-for exchange. Rather, Sheng-Li has simply stated his motive for giving his son a gift. Sometimes, employers offer to cover the costs of employment-related education for their employees. The employees may then be required to repay their employers for all or a portion of the costs. At the center of the dispute in the following case was an agreement signed by an employee to reimburse his employer for educational costs. The question was whether the agreement met the requirement of a bargained-for exchange. Case Analysis 13.2 USS–POSCO Industries v. Case California Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, 244 Cal.App.4th 197, 197 Cal.Rptr.3d 791 (2016). In the Language of the Court BANKE, J. [Judge] * * * * [USS–POSCO Industries (UPI) in Pittsburg, California,] hired [Floyd] Case in 2007. He initially worked as an entry-level Laborer and Side Trim Operator. As a condition of employment, Case joined Local 1440 of the United Steelworkers of America. UPI faced a shortage of skilled Maintenance Technical Electrical (MTE) workers. To address this, UPI, after consultation with Local 1440, decided to implement a Learner Program. Thus, in June 2008, the company and Local 1440 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stating UPI would train up to 10 current employees, while continuing to pay their wages and benefits, in an effort to qualify them as MTEs. UPI and the union recognized “that, due to the strong demand for Maintenance Technician Electrical [workers] the Company needs to retain successful candidates as employees for a reasonable period of time in order to recoup its substantial $46,000 investment in their training.” UPI and the union therefore agreed UPI “may require candidates in the Learner Program to sign [a] Reimbursement Agreement that would require reimbursement for a portion of the training should a candidate voluntarily terminate employment within 30 months of completion of the Learner Program.” The Learner Program required 135 weeks of instruction, 90 weeks of on the job training and 45 weeks of classroom work (partially courses at a local community college, partially other courses). The goal was to complete training within 162 weeks, or just over three years. If a participant successfully completed the program and then passed UPI’s MTE test, he or she would be assigned to an MTE vacancy. The MTE position and Learner Program aligned with Case’s desire to work as an engineer. Case understood joining the Learner Program was voluntary. He also understood he did not need to go through the Learner Program or a similar formal educational program to obtain an MTE position. * * * A prospect could simply take and pass UPI’s MTE test. However, Case did not attempt the test prior to participating in the Learner Program because he did not think he had the knowledge to pass. He was also unsure if he would pass if he undertook a self-study program. In any case, the Learner Program allowed him to get trained during the workday instead of after hours, and it would lead to higher pay. Accordingly, he applied for the program and was one of [the] selected participants. Case was informed of the reimbursement obligation during a training session for prospective participants. A presentation slide entitled “Repayment Agreement” told prospects they would “sign an agreement to reimburse a portion of their training cost should they voluntarily terminate employment within 30 months of program completion.” The slide, consistent with the MOU, indicated the obligation would be “$46,000 prorated over 30 months.” Case was subsequently presented with a written reimbursement agreement and signed it without objection. Under that one-page agreement, Case acknowledged UPI would pay his “wages, benefits and training expenses” while he was in the Learner Program, but there would be no guarantee participation in the program would insure promotion, transfer, or continued employment with UPI. He further agreed that if he was fired for cause or voluntarily left UPI within 30 months after completing the program, he would, absent a compelling hardship such as a serious injury or family death, refund $30,000 of the expense of his training, less $1,000 per month of subsequent service at UPI. Two months after completing the Learner Program and obtaining an MTE position, Case left UPI for Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to work as a high voltage electrician. * * * * When Case refused to reimburse UPI, the company filed the instant lawsuit [in a California state court] alleging breach of contract * * *. UPI sought damages of $28,000—that is, $1,000 per month that remained in Case’s 30-month earn-back period. Case, in turn,