Please engage with only one question/article, and indicate which one
1.What are some similarities and differences among the Five Eyes in how they've reacted to 9/11? What are the key challenges for the Five Eyes in the future and how might they be met? What are the effects on the Five Eyes of the shift from formal terrorist organizations to lone wolves? Should the Five Eyes be dismantled, as some have called for?
2.Do you agree or disagree with the idea that the Five Eyes alliance disadvantages “junior” partners like Australia? Why?
CNN article:
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/16/tech/surveillance-privacy-coronavirus-npw-intl/index.html
NYT article:
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/us/politics/counterterrorism-intelligence.html
the attached files are the readings and lectures of the week
5.18.2020 Lecture Slides 3012 PICT 3012: INTELLIGENCE POLICY Bridget Rose Nolan, Ph.D. Macquarie University ADMINISTRATIVE STUFF • Last class in two weeks! J/L • Intelligence report due Sunday, 11:59pm Sydney time • DONE IS GOOD! FINAL EXAM • Take-home: open-book, open-note, anything on iLearn • Answer two essay questions from three options • Posted on iLearn under Assessments on June 1 • Due through TurnItIn by June 12, 11:59pm Sydney time • Open Q and A session via Zoom, May 28 10am Sydney time FIVE EYES • Alliance among the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand • Keeping things fresh: preventing groupthink, strengthening analysis • WWII, post-9/11 changes, IC relationships, ethics • FISA: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act “U.S. PERSON” • A citizen of the United States • An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence • An unincorporated association with a substantial number of members who are citizens of the U.S. or permanent residents • A corporation that is incorporated in the U.S. ASYMMETRY IN THE FIVE EYES? • “Senior” and “Junior” members • Benefits to junior members: • Protection from senior members when needed; access to intel • Strengthening of bilateral relations • Benefits to senior members: • Expanding global reach • Legitimacy ASYMMETRY IN THE FIVE EYES? • Do senior members bully junior members? • Ultimately, the author argues no Untitled Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=caji20 Australian Journal of International Affairs ISSN: 1035-7718 (Print) 1465-332X (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20 Australia and the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network: the perils of an asymmetric alliance Andrew O’Neil To cite this article: Andrew O’Neil (2017) Australia and the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network: the perils of an asymmetric alliance, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 71:5, 529-543, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763 Published online: 06 Jul 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 2614 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 3 View citing articles https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=caji20 https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763 https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763 https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=caji20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=caji20&show=instructions https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/mlt/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-07-06 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763&domain=pdf&date_stamp=2017-07-06 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763#tabModule https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763#tabModule Australia and the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network: the perils of an asymmetric alliance Andrew O’Neil Griffith Business School, Griffith University, Gold Coast, Australia ABSTRACT Aside from NATO, the Five Eyes intelligence network between the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand is the world’s most enduring multilateral arrangement of its type. While the Five Eyes network does not constitute a formal security alliance in the classic sense of the term, it does emulate significant features of how alliances operate in practice, including active burden-sharing and intra-alliance bargaining. Most analysts claim that the USA dictates in hierarchical fashion the terms and conditions of how the Five Eyes network functions, and that junior partners have little alternative but to fall in line if they want to preserve the flow of high-grade intelligence from Washington. Using Australia as a case study, this article shows that a more fluid relationship has been at play, one that challenges conventional assumptions about asymmetrical alliances and the role of junior partners. KEYWORDS alliances; Five Eyes; intelligence cooperation; UKUSA Introduction Intelligence cooperation between states is a perennial feature of international relations. As the sources and methods of collection have become increasingly sophisticated, the value yielded by intelligence exchanges has risen accordingly. For allies of the USA, by far the world’s pre-eminent collector of all-source intelligence, this has been especially the case. As Loch Johnson (2008, 64) points out: ‘the US continues to have the largest and most expensive intelligence apparatus in the world, indeed in the history of humankind’. It is essentially because of this, critics charge, that Washington dominates intelligence cooperation among allies due to the sheer scale of its collection capabilities, its desire to exert control over other states, and the well-established hostility on the part of US intelli- gence agencies towards non-compliant foreign governments. The evident asymmetry that characterises the relationship between the USA and its allies, according to this perspective, produces outcomes that are inimical to the interests of smaller countries, which have little choice but to accept the consequences of the power imbalance (see, for instance, Beeson 2015; Klein 1988). In this article, I challenge the claim that junior intelligence partners of the USA are victims of a power imbalance that produces outcomes antithetical to their interests. Just as smaller states often seek out generic security alliances with major powers, they also © 2017 Australian Institute of International Affairs CONTACT Andrew O’Neil a.oneil@griffith.edu.au AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2017 VOL. 71, NO. 5, 529–543 https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763 http://crossmark.crossref.org/dialog/?doi=10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763&domain=pdf mailto:a.oneil@griffith.edu.au http://www.tandfonline.com covet the benefits that flow from intimate intelligence-sharing arrangements with more powerful states. As with alliances broadly, junior partners that have intelligence-sharing arrangements with more powerful states are willing to sacrifice some autonomy in return for pay-offs in other areas. While many states eschew asymmetrical security alli- ances with the USA, the strengthening of the USA’s alliances since the end of the Cold War is testament to the value that smaller states believe they extract from these arrange- ments. This article advances this argument by examining the so-called ‘Five Eyes’ network, which is the formal intelligence-sharing relationship between the USA, the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In placing Australia’s role in the Five Eyes network in the forefront of the analysis, I argue that the network should, in fact, be seen more in terms of an alliance than a ‘club’ among Anglosphere countries, as it is often portrayed. Australian governments have issued several DefenceWhite Papers since the mid-1970s, but only in the most recent Defence White Paper—released in February 2016—was Aus- tralia’s participation in the Five Eyes intelligence network covered in detail (Grayson 2016). This was embedded in discussion of the bilateral alliance with the USA, with the document noting that ‘Australia’s membership of the Five Eyes intelligence community (comprising Australia, the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada) provides Australia with information superiority and intelligence cooperation that is vital input into our defence planning’ (Department of Defence 2016, 122). Notably, the 2016 Defence White Paper also made specific reference to the ‘close’ intelli- gence cooperation Australia has with Canada as ‘members of the Five Eyes intelligence community’ (138). For Australian policymakers, the Five Eyes arrangement is inextricably bound up with the bilateral alliance with the USA, and in many respects is an ancillary element of that alliance. However, as I argue, the Five Eyes network itself should be regarded as emulating many of the key features of alliances.1 Here, I define an alliance to be a formal bilateral or multi- lateral commitment by states to support other states in defending their security. Alliances can be distinguished from coalitions or alignments of common security interest among states. The latter rarely, if ever, contain any treaty commitments and are usually short- term relationships of convenience that lack the depth and intimacy characteristic of formal alliance relationships. As Kenneth Waltz (1979, 166) has argued, alliances are typi- cally directed at specific threats: ‘The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states’. Yet, the purpose of alliances can change over time and need not always be directed at a specific state or states. The Five Eyes network reflects many of the core characteristics that appear in the literature on alliances, including burden-sharing, intra-alliance bargaining and a deepening normative commitment over time (Snyder 1997). Indeed, looking at Five Eyes as an alliance can help shed important insights into how its members interact, and the dynamics that shape the behaviour of each state. This article addresses two interlinked questions. First, to what extent does the Five Eyes intelligence network mirror attributes we would expect to find in alliance relationships? And second, what can Australia’s role in the network tell us about whether its inherent asymmetries disadvantage junior partners? These questions are significant because they go to the heart of how security arrangements are managed in the contemporary world. In particular, the questions focus on the proposition of whether junior partners receive benefits commensurate with the risks they run in being allied to more dominant, and potentially domineering, partners. Examining Australia’s approach to the Five Eyes 530 A. O’NEIL alliance helps to address these questions and makes an important contribution to a key theme of this special issue—namely, how material and transactional considerations in the national security policymaking arena intersect with normative dynamics. The oper- ation of contemporary alliances is in many respects the ideal case study; they invariably involve detached cost–benefit calculations, but the most enduring alliances are also under- pinned by genuine and robust normative commitment. This is frequently overlooked in the secondary literature on alliances, which is almost always dominated by realist analysis that discounts the influence of non-material variables in international relations. The article proceeds in four parts. The first section outlines many of the prominent themes in the secondary literature on alliances and focuses particularly on the role of junior alliance partners. This provides an important framework for analysing the evol- ution of the Five Eyes network and Australia’s role within it. Section two outlines the prin- cipal attributes of the network and how it evolved from a series of discrete wartime agreements as part of a broader alliance effort into a worldwide multilateral alliance in its own right. The third section of the article examines how Australia has engaged in Five Eyes over time, how its role as a supplier and consumer of intelligence has shaped this engagement, and whether the costs to Australia have exceeded the benefits. The final section of the article draws conclusions from the preceding analysis and charts direc- tions for future research in the field. Understanding the dynamics of alliances The formation of alliances, how they operate over time and whether they can be sustained over the long term are all contingent on a range of factors. In particular, the perceived reliability of security guarantees and assurances is central to alliances, and this, in turn, is influenced by the reputation of the major power to ‘deliver’ on past commitments in international relations (see Mattes 2012; Miller 2003). As the country with the greatest experience of alliance management, the USA is closely attuned to the issue of credibility in its alliance relationships, and successive administrations since World War II have been conscious of the need to uphold commitments in one part of the world to ensure the USA’s reliability as an ally is preserved globally. Reassuring alliance partners of US commitment to their security is a hallmark of the assorted declarations that follow alliance summits. In order