On Philosophy,
various questions about Thomson's Moral Analogical Argument for Abortion
Without Referencing
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The Case of the Sick Violinist It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you--we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you." Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? [What if someone were to say that you have to stay attached to the violinist because] “… All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body.” [So you cannot be unplugged from him.] I imagine you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago. (from J.J. Thomson ‘A Defence of Abortion) http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil160,Fall02/thomson.htm A Moral Analogical Argument Form P1 Case C resembles Case D in respects 1, 2, 3… P2 Action A is obviously justified in Case D. C Action A1 is justified in Case C. (Note: there is an unstated premise: Similar cases should be treated in similar ways.) An Analogical Argument for the Moral Permissibility of Abortion P1 Pregnancy resembles ‘The Case of the Sick Violinist’ in the following respects: a human being requires the use of another person’s body in order to survive; the dependence imposes a burden on that person. P2 In ‘The case of the Sick Violinist’ it is obviously morally permissible for you to detach yourself from him, even though he will die as a result. C It is morally permissible for a pregnant woman to have an abortion. The Case of the People-Seeds Again, suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, one of the screens is defective, and a seed drifts in and takes root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right to the use of your house? Surely not--despite the fact that you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew that screens were sometimes defective. Someone may argue that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have a right to your house, because after all you could have lived out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed windows and doors. But this won't do--for by the same token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving home without a (reliable!) army. (Thomson ibid)