In the lecture, we have been assuming that firms can charge any price they want, for instance, $1.2745. In reality, firms usually only specify the dollar and the cent of a good. For instance, a firm...

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Extracted text: In the lecture, we have been assuming that firms can charge any price they want, for instance, $1.2745. In reality, firms usually only specify the dollar and the cent of a good. For instance, a firm may only be able to charge $1.27 or $1.28 instead of $1.2745 for a good. Under this more realistic assumption, consider a two-firm Bertrand competition game where both firms have a constant marginal cost of $2. The market demand function is Q(p)=10-p. In this game, is ($2, $2) a Bertrand equilibrium? Is ($2.01, $2.01) a Bertrand equilibrium? (In these vectors, the first dimension refers to the price charged by firm 1, and the second dimension refers to that of firm 2. Since Bertrand equilibrium is the Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand competition model, you can follow the definition of Nash equilibrium to verify if the described strategy profile is a Bertrand equilibrium.) Yes. Yes. O Yes. No O No. Yes. No. No.