In the fishing-boat game of Section 3.B, we showed how it is possible for there to be a uniquely rationalizable outcome in continuous strategies that is also a Nash equilibrium. However, this is not...


In the fishing-boat game of Section 3.B, we showed how it is possible for there to be a uniquely rationalizable outcome in continuous strategies that is also a Nash equilibrium. However, this is not always the case; there may be many rationalizable strategies, and not all of them will necessarily be part of a Nash equilibrium. Returning to the political advertising game of Exercise S1, find the set of rationalizable strategies for party L. (Due to their symmetric payoffs, the set of rationalizable strategies will be the same for party R.) Explain your reasoning.




May 26, 2022
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