I have 4 questions on Military Ethics that once I open need to be answered within 3 1/2 hours on attached files a solid answer on each a solid paragraph on each 4 answers
adkanENG11_4 _corrected.pdf Strategic Assessment 83 Decision against a Terrorist Organization: Operation Cast Lead – A Case Study Zaki Shalom As far as can be seen, Operation Cast Lead achieved some significant successes from Israel’s perspective, though some have yet to be proven. In the course of the operation, massive damage was inflicted on Hamas’ civilian and military infrastructures in the Gaza Strip, and hundreds of operatives were killed or wounded. Hamas leaders defined the situation in Gaza as a disaster. Khaled Mashal, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, called the IDF operation “a holocaust.” Reports on the extent of the damage were submitted by both foreign reporters and diplomats. The Hamas government will have to budget significant resources to rebuild the area. One may assume that during the rehabilitation, however long it lasts, Hamas will seek to maintain calm.1 It is almost certain that to a certain extent, the operation strengthened Israel’s deterrence with regard to Hamas, and perhaps also with regard to other hostile elements in this region. However, the scope of this deterrence should not be overestimated. In an interview after the war, the prime minister perhaps exaggerated the scope and force of the deterrence achieved: “Today,” Prime Minister Olmert declared, “Israel’s deterrence is higher than ever, not just in the last decade but much beyond that. This is deterrence against the entire axis of evil, and whoever needs to know it – knows…The war in Lebanon created deterrence not only vis-à-vis Hizbollah but also with regard to Syria.” Deterrence, by its nature, is valid within defined parameters of time and space. Its force is tested the more time passes. In any case, there Prof. Zaki Shalom, senior research associate at INSS 84 St ra te gi c A ss es sm en t ZAKI SHALOM | DECISION AGAINST A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION is no certainty that deterrence in the southern sector will translate, for example, to the northern sector as well and apply to Hizbollah.2 Israel apparently succeeded in conveying to Hamas that the rules of the game that were in place before the operation have changed beyond recognition. On the basis of the new rules, the IDF’s fire response policy will be completely different than before. Senior IDF officers made such announcements already several months ago. However, their statements were met with a great deal of skepticism regarding the Israeli military’s determination to implement the new rules. Operation Cast Lead proved that the IDF did, in fact, adopt a new policy, greatly different from that which preceded it. In the context of the new rules, Israel almost certainly succeeded in creating a credible threat that it is prepared to use tremendous, expressly disproportionate firepower and target, if necessary, populated areas, mosques, schools, universities, UN institutions, and other sites hitherto considered to be beyond Israel’s reach.3 Another Israeli achievement was the establishment of a more effective oversight mechanism than in the past regarding the arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip, which will involve efforts by Egypt, the United States, and the European Union. The prime minister said, “we insisted on stopping [the war] only when we were able to reach an agreement with Egypt [over the smuggling of arms into the Gaza Strip]. This is a detailed agreement – in writing. No more whispering in someone’s ear: ‘he said, I said.’ Everything is documented down to the last item, in their commitments, actions, efforts, understandings with the Americans and the Europeans. There has never been anything like this before.” However, the true effectiveness of the mechanism will become clear depending on the circumstances on the ground over time. The existence of a written agreement, no matter how detailed, cannot by itself guarantee its fulfillment in practice. The pursuit and raid by American forces of an Iranian weapons ship transporting arms to the Gaza Strip may point to a positive development from Israel’s perspective.4 The war emphasized and deepened the rift in the Arab world between the moderates and the radicals. Amr Moussa, secretary of the Arab League (who should understand the Arab world better than others) stated during the operation that the Arab world was on the brink of a rift and total anarchy. The weakening of the Arab world may allow Israel greater room to maneuver internationally if Israel is smart enough to take 85 St ra te gi c A ss es sm en t ZAKI SHALOM | DECISION AGAINST A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION advantage of this opportunity. Furthermore, the confrontation between the two blocs of Arab nations has demonstrated that the moderate camp, led by Egypt, has the upper hand. This, too, is a phenomenon that serves the interests of the State of Israel. Nonetheless, in this case as well there is need for great caution. In the past, the Arab world has known difficult quarrels and schisms that were ultimately resolved in a way that could hardly be considered as serving Israel’s interests.5 Finally, the war stressed the great interest within the international community, especially the United States and Europe, in the war on terrorism. The appearance of leading European heads of states in Israel at the end of the war alongside the Israeli prime minister and other government ministers at a supportive and festive gathering demonstrated this stance explicitly. In many ways, this could have served as the “victory picture.” In light of these achievements, senior political and military personnel expressed their opinion that “the operation’s objectives were fully attained.” And yet, in wide circles among the political and military echelons as well as among the public at large, there is a feeling of having missed the target. One may suggest three hypotheses about the gap between the feelings of achievement and letdown: After the Second Lebanon War, the military echelon, particularly a. Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, repeatedly stressed that in the next confrontation Israel must achieve a clear decision on the ground so that the question of “who won the war” is not asked. This statement created the expectation of a more unequivocal decision in this campaign. It is now probably clear to many that this is an unattainable goal when fighting terrorist organizations. It may be that the so-called sense of victory is determined without b. regard for the official objectives articulated for the operation by the country’s leadership. Public opinion forms an independent stance with regard to what the operation’s goals were supposed to have been, and it is with regard to these that the public judges the outcome of the war. The feelings of failure were displayed in the media in the context of three main elements: (a) Hamas did not concede defeat and did not seek, at least publicly, a ceasefire without preconditions; (b) the mechanism for controlling the smuggling of arms in the Gaza Strip does not supply Israel with 86 St ra te gi c A ss es sm en t ZAKI SHALOM | DECISION AGAINST A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION foolproof safeguards; and (c) the conditions for releasing Gilad Shalit were not visibly improved.6 It is also possible that public opinion is shaped by the fact that the c. official objectives presented by the political echelon do not reflect the range of true goals the political echelon sought to achieve through this operation. In the case of Operation Cast Lead, the understated goals were probably meant on the one hand, to provide cover in case the more extensive objectives were not met, and on the other, to generate great satisfaction should objectives beyond expectations be attained. The prime minister himself lent credence to this view when he stated that “none of you ever heard me say what I really want to achieve, the goals I set, other than the official statement. Why? Because I thought it would be a mistake to do so.”7 These insights into how feelings of victory take on a reality of their own must be digested by Israel’s decision makers before another military confrontation with terrorist organizations in the north and south breaks out. Given the prevailing circumstances, the probability of that happening is close to certain. Notes 1 Barak Ravid, “Operation Cast Lead; Chief of Military Intelligence: ‘Hamas is Seeking Appearance of Victory to Avoid Loss of Face,’” Haaretz, January 11, 2009. Regarding Mashal’s statements, see “Operation Cast Lead – A War Diary,” January 10, at http://www.sikurmemukad.com/ gaza2009/?p=561, and Thalif Deen, “UNRWA Chief Appalled at Israeli Destruction in Gaza,” at http://antiwar.com/. 2 Ben Caspit, “Now You Deal with It,” Maariv, January 23, 2009. Regarding the statements made by the Chief of Military Intelligence, see Israel TV’s Channel 2 News, January 11, 2009, at http://news.reshet.tv/News/Poli- tics/StatePolicy/Article,11392.aspx. 3 For IDF’s “new” response policy, see Zaki Shalom, Ron Ben Yishai, “Shock Treatment,” Ynet, December 27, 2008. 4 For Olmert’s statement, see Ben Caspit, “Now You Deal with It,” Maariv, January 23, 2009. 5 Hagai Huberman, Amr Moussa, “The Arab World on the Brink of Col- lapse,” Israel TV’s Channel 7, January 19, 2009, at http://www.inn.co.il/ News/News.aspx/184369. 6 As for the sense of failure in the IDF, see Amos Harel, “Operation Cast Lead: Field Commanders Summarize the Fighting in Gaza,” Haaretz, Janu- ary 23, 2009. 7 Caspit, “Now You Deal with It,” Maariv, January 23, 2009. Microsoft Word - Title Page Label.doc CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 09:012:312 PROFESSOR LENNOX S. HINDS RUTGERS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES April 2012 WAR CRIMES IN GAZA: Operation Cast Lead in International Law Joseph S. Amditis CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 09:012:312 PROFESSOR LENNOX S. HINDS APRIL 2012 WAR CRIMES IN GAZA: Operation Cast Lead in International Law Joseph S. Amditis TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION.................