HIS 450
Research Paper: First Draft
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Write the first draft of your research paper. The first draft should be 3,000-3,750 words (approximately 12-15 pages if the template is used correctly), not including the required bibliography and cover page. Be sure to include the following:
- Affirm your thesis on the approved research topic you have selected.
- Evaluate relevant and valid research that reflects the ethical standards in the discipline of history.
- Demonstrate proper interpretation of historical sources.
- Utilize research to validate your ideas and supporting claims.
The grading standards will be as rigorous as those set for the final research paper. Be careful to proofread and edit the first draft to the quality of a final draft.
The instructor will provide feedback; but continue to edit for clarity, coherence, argument, and historical interpretation throughout the duration of the topic.
Use only sources found at the GCU Library or those provided in Course and/or Topic Materials.
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The Roles of Bipolarity: A Role Theoretic Understanding of the Effects of Ideas and Material Factors on the Cold War The Roles of Bipolarity: A Role Theoretic Understanding of the Effects of Ideas and Material Factors on the Cold War CAMERON G. THIES University of Iowa Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have debated the merits of the major theoretical traditions in international relations and foreign policy. Neorealism was criticized for failing to predict the end of bipolarity in material capabilities. Constructivism emerged during this time as a viable alternative explanation for the Cold War based on the role of ideas. This paper seeks to assess the impact of material and ideational factors on the origin, development, and end of the Cold War through an examina- tion of the roles adopted by U.S. Presidents in their foreign policy doctrines. The paper finds that the origin of the Cold War was primarily ideational and was constituted by the “roles of bipolarity” adopted in the Truman Doctrine. During the Cold War, minor variations in these roles can be explained by shifts in material capabilities. The end of the Cold War was the result of changes in Soviet ideas, which were later con- firmed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the end of bipolarity, we see the United States struggling to identify its proper foreign policy role. Introduction This paper explores how ideational and material factors explain the advent, evo- lution, and end of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States.1 Neorealism offers the familiar explanation of the bipolar distribution of material capabilities as the dominant factor affecting the behavior of states in the system. Indeed, critics have noted that Waltz’s (1979) theory may be best sui- ted to explaining the stability of a bipolar system, and Waltz himself dotes on the virtues of the bipolarity. However, constructivism may provide an equally compelling account of Cold War culture and its effects on the identity and behavior of states in the system. The purpose of this paper is to provide a quali- tative assessment of the two contending systemic approaches to international politics through an examination of U.S. foreign policy doctrines. The roles that U.S. Presidents adopt through these doctrines are ideas that can be compared with documented shifts in material capabilities. This compari- son of ideational with material capability changes assists in sorting out which fac- tor may on balance be most responsible for the origin, evolution, and end of the Cold War. The paper examines the doctrines issued by the Truman through the George H. W. Bush Administrations in order to demonstrate changes, or the lack thereof, in ideas about the U.S. role in the world as well as material 1Important works engaging the end of the Cold War include Brooks and Wohlforth (2000/01), Wohlforth (1999), Wohlforth (1998), Lebow and Risse-Kappen (1995), Wohlforth (1994/95), Gaddis (1992/93), Wagner (1993), and Snyder (1991). Thies, Cameron G. (2012) The Roles of Bipolarity: A Role Theoretic Understanding of the Effects of Ideas and Material Factors on the Cold War. International Studies Perspectives, doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2012.00486.x © 2012 International Studies Association International Studies Perspectives (2013) 14, 269–288. capabilities before, during, and after the Cold War. The paper concludes that the Cold War was largely an ideational construct that rested on the “roles of bipolarity” originally formulated by Truman. However, during the Cold War, minor changes in these roles are attributable to changes in material capabilities. The end of the Cold War was the result of changes in Soviet ideas, which would later find support in changed material circumstances when the Soviet Union collapsed. Post-Cold War doctrines demonstrate a wider menu of choices for U.S. identity and behavior, largely due to the lack of material constraints. Ideational and Material Explanations of International Relations and Foreign Policy The basic tenets of Wendt’s (1999:1) constructivism are “(i) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than mate- rial forces and (ii) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are con- structed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.” The ontology of international life he advocates is “social in the sense that it is through ideas that states ultimately relate to one another, and constructionist in the sense that these ideas help define who and what states are (Wendt 1999:372).” This “struc- tural idealism” stands in stark contrast to the structural materialism of Waltz (1979). Wendt’s (1999) version of constructivism also differs considerably from that proposed by Adler (1997). Adler argues that constructivism occupies the “middle ground” between materialism and idealism, and holism and individual- ism. For Adler (1997:323) “constructivism represents the first real opportunity to generate a synthetic theory of international relations since E. H. Carr.” In fact, Wendt (1999:139) agrees that a fully specified theory of international politics would consider both the material and ideational structures of the system; yet, Wendt attempts to push the limit of what can be explained solely by structure conceived in terms of ideas, just as Waltz (1979) focuses entirely on explanations in terms of a material structure. To test the explanatory power of each perspective, the paper will focus on the foreign policy doctrines issued by U.S. presidents.2 To further explore the impact of ideas, the paper focuses on the types of roles adopted by U.S. presi- dents as set forth in their doctrines. By focusing on roles as the elemental units of foreign policy doctrines, we can more easily compare them across time.3 The focus on roles is consistent with Wendt’s (1999) constructivist approach, and is not inconsistent with Waltz’s (1990:222) general approach, as he has used the language of roles to suggest that in the post-Cold War era “the old and the new great powers will have to learn new roles and figure out how to enact them on a shifting stage. New roles are hard to learn, and actors easily trip when playing on unfamiliar sets.” By focusing on foreign policy doctrines, we are also assum- ing that theories of international politics can inform the study of foreign policy behavior, particularly over long periods of time.4 While Waltz discusses great power roles in the abstract, Wendt (1999:246) focuses on three particular roles: enemy, rival, and friend. Wendt’s argument is that each of these three roles can produce a particular “culture of anarchy” if they come to dominate during ongoing interstate interaction. Wendt’s (1999:327) argument is that role identities are learned and reinforced in 2Equivalent foreign policy doctrines from Soviet leaders are the exception rather than the rule. They include Kruschev’s “peaceful coexistence,” the Brezhnev Doctrine, and Gorbachev’s “New Thinking.” 3See Holsti (1970), Walker (1987), Harnisch, Frank and Maull (2011), and Thies and Breuning (2012) for prior work on foreign policy roles. 4Waltz has always maintained that theories of international politics cannot explain foreign policy behavior, although other neorealists disagree with his claim (for example, Elman 1996). 270 Effects of Ideas and Material Factors on the Cold War response to how states are treated by significant others. For example, as more and more members of the system represent each other as enemies, then a tipping point is reached whereby all members of a system are assumed to be enemies (Wendt 1999:264). In Wendt’s analysis, this would produce the Hobbesian culture of anarchy that is the staple of political realism. However, Wendt’s use of roles and identity theory is problematic in certain respects. First, limiting states (even analytically) to one of three roles does not make theoretical sense. Identity theory, which is used by Wendt, conceives the self to be multifaceted, with the possibility of adopting as many role identities as the individual has structured role relationships (Stryker and Serpe 1982; Stryker 1987). Even if a state only had three role identities to choose from, it is not clear why any single one of them should come to dominate. Further, how could the complex, differentiated social system presupposed by identity theory maintain itself if all of the individuals occupied the exact same role as Wendt expects will happen in each of his three cultures? Second, empirically we do not observe any of Wendt’s role identities dominating the international system.5 Even in our current Lockean culture, as Wendt describes it, we do not see all states envision- ing each other as rivals. Nor do we see all states becoming friends to move us toward a Kantian culture. Even states that conceive of themselves as allies are not necessarily friends, and may at times be rivals. Thies (2010a), following earlier work by Walker (1987), argues that focusing on roles through the use of role theory has descriptive, organizational, and explanatory advantages for the study of foreign policy and international rela- tions. On the level of description, role theory has a rich conceptual language that allows us to classify state identities and interaction processes considering an overarching social structure. This social structure, consisting of a role system or what Wendt (1999) would call a distribution of knowledge, is consistent with most constructivist accounts. As Thies (2003, 2010b, 2012) has argued, it is at least not inconsistent with Waltz’s theory, if one takes the logic of socialization contained therein seriously. States adopt role identities, which are idealized self- conceptions of roles that already exist in the international role system, such as balancer, great power, liberation supporter, defender of the faith, and so on (see Holsti 1970 for familiar examples). Once states adopt a role identity, or are altercast by others into a role identity, then a role location process occurs whereby the state attempts to figure out through its interactions with significant others if the role identity is appropriate as well as how to enact that role. Particu- lar states may be required to adopt appropriate counterroles to complete a role relationship, and the audience of states may intervene in this process as well. What follows is an analysis of the actual, as opposed to hypothetical roles (c.f., Wendt 1999) adopted by the United States as a result of the issuance of foreign policy doctrines. Role theory allows us to organize a comparison of the idea- tional and material components of the Cold War across these doctrines. The analysis will deal with the Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush Doctrines. The explanatory value of role theory and a focus on roles for understanding foreign policy and international relations is highlighted through the analyses of these cases of U.S. doctrines. These cases could be considered observations in a quasi-experimental, interrupted time ser- ies design (Campbell and Stanley 1963), with the Truman through Reagan Doc- trines acting as observations prior to the “treatment.” The treatment in this case is the transitional period between the end of the Cold War in 1989 and the end of bipolarity in 1991. The George H