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1076 [Journal of Political Economy, 2003, vol. 111, no. 5] ! 2003 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/2003/11105-0004$10.00 Can Free Entry Be Inefficient? Fixed Commissions and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry Chang-Tai Hsieh Princeton University and National Bureau of Economic Research Enrico Moretti University of California, Los Angeles and National Bureau of Economic Research Real estate agents typically charge a 6 percent commission, regardless of the price of the house sold. As a consequence, the commission fee from selling a house will differ dramatically across cities depending on the average price of housing, although the effort necessary to match buyers and sellers may not be that different. We use a simple economic model to show that if barriers to entry are low, the entry of real estate agents in cities with high housing prices is socially in- efficient. Consistent with our model, we find that when the average price of land in a city increases, (1) the fraction of real estate brokers in a city increases, (2) the productivity of an average real estate agent (houses sold per hour worked) falls, and (3) the real wage of a typical real estate agent remains unchanged. We cannot completely rule out the alternative explanation that these results reflect unmeasured dif- ferences in the quality of broker services. However, we present evi- dence that as the average price of housing in a city increases, there is only a small increase in the amount of time a buyer spends searching We thank Ben Bernanke, David Card, Angus Deaton, Harold Demsetz, William Easterly, Ray Fisman, Gene Grossman, Karla Hoff, Peter Klenow, Phillip Leslie, Steve Levitt, Darren Lubotsky, Chris Redfearn, Scott Susin, John Wallis, and a referee for useful comments. We gratefully acknowledge partial financial support from the Center for Economic Policy Studies at Princeton University and the Academic Senate at UCLA. Hsieh worked on parts of this project while visiting the World Bank’s Development Research Group, which he thanks for its hospitality. This paper previously circulated under the title “Uncovering Rent-Seeking and Social Waste: A Parable from the Real Estate Market.” free entry 1077 for a house, and the average time a house for sale stays on the market falls. I. Introduction There is a widespread view that barriers to entry of new businesses are harmful and that society would benefit from the removal of such bar- riers. Yet it has also long been known that under certain conditions, free entry may actually be socially wasteful (see Spence 1976a, 1976b; Dixit and Stiglitz 1977; Mankiw and Whinston 1986). The basic idea is that while the competition due to new entrants may lower prices, en- trants also steal business from existing firms, and this latter effect could result in a socially inefficient overspreading of output. The net gain from market entry thus depends on whether the price competition effect outweighs the business-stealing effect. Yet, despite the possibility that market entry may be socially inefficient, there is little empirical work that measures the net social gains from market entry.1 In this paper, we fill this gap by measuring the effect of entry in the U.S. residential real estate brokerage market. Two char- acteristics of the real estate industry make it particularly interesting. First, there appear to be few barriers to entry in the industry. Second, in the period under consideration in this paper, the brokerage com- mission paid to the real estate agents handling the sale of a house is almost always stated as a fixed 6 percent of the selling price of the house. What is particularly surprising about the apparent uniformity of the commission rate is that it implies that a real estate agent’s commission from selling a house will differ dramatically depending on the price of the house, although the effort necessary to sell an expensive house may not be much different from that required to sell a cheaper home. The main argument of this paper is that if in fact commission rates are fixed, then the absence of barriers to entry results in socially wasteful entry by real estate agents in cities with high housing costs. Consider, for example, two cities—Boston and Minneapolis—that are similar in most dimensions except in the cost of housing. In 1990, the price of a typical house in Boston was roughly twice that in Minneapolis.2 With a fixed commission rate, the brokerage fee from selling a typical house in Boston was therefore twice that of a similar transaction in Minne- 1 The only work that we are aware of is Berry and Waldfogel’s (1999) work on radio stations in the United States. There is a literature on the effect of entry on firm size and pricing behavior (see, e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss 1991), but this literature does not focus on the potential losses due to the business-stealing effect. 2 According to the 1990 census, the average price of residential housing was $216,231 in Boston and $100,504 in Minneapolis. 1078 journal of political economy apolis. If this is all there is to the story, real estate agents in Boston would simply earn twice as much as their counterparts in Minneapolis. Real estate commissions would simply be a transfer from home sellers and home buyers to real estate agents, and the deadweight loss from the fixed commission in Boston would probably be small, especially if the demand for real estate transactions is relatively price-inelastic. However, because there is relatively free entry into the real estate business, an average real estate agent in Boston does not earn twice as much as an agent in Minneapolis. Because the commission from selling a typical house is twice as high in Boston as it is in Minneapolis, there are more real estate agents in Boston seeking these high commissions, although the total number of homes sold each year is actually larger in Minneapolis. Consequently, the average real estate agent in Minneapolis is much more productive than a typical agent in Boston, selling 6.6 houses each year in Minneapolis as compared to an average 3.3 houses a year in Boston.3 One could still argue that there is something fundamentally different between Boston and Minneapolis, that the effort necessary to sell a house in Boston is simply twice the effort necessary in Minneapolis. Perhaps the dense urban structure or the older age of dwellings in Boston makes it harder for brokers to sell houses, or perhaps descen- dants of Irish Catholics are more finicky about their housing than de- scendants of Germans and Scandinavians. However, it has not always taken twice as many real estate agents to sell a house in Boston as in Minneapolis. Although the productivity of real estate agents in Min- neapolis was twice that in Boston in 1990, the difference was much smaller in 1980. In 1980, a typical real estate agent in Boston sold six houses, whereas her counterpart in Minneapolis sold seven homes. What accounts for this change? From 1980 to 1990, housing prices doubled in Boston, whereas the average price of housing in Minneapolis remained unchanged. Since the commission rate is fixed, the commis- sion from selling a house in Boston increased from 1980 to 1990 and thus attracted many people into the real estate business in Boston seek- ing to earn these fees. By 1990, the number of real estate agents in Boston had roughly doubled. And since the number of houses sold in Boston in 1990 had roughly remained unchanged, the productivity of an average real estate agent in Boston in 1990 had fallen to almost half of what it was in 1980. The tragedy of this outcome is that despite the fact that home sellers in Boston pay twice as much to real estate agents as in Minneapolis, real estate agents in Boston are no better off than in Minneapolis, nor 3 We see a similar productivity gap when we measure productivity as houses sold per hour worked: 0.0018 in Boston and 0.0036 in Minneapolis. free entry 1079 Fig. 1.—1980–90 changes in the productivity of real estate agents (houses sold in the city/hours worked) and changes in the cost of housing. Each bubble represents a met- ropolitan area. The size of the bubble is proportional to the metropolitan area population. There are 282 metropolitan areas. Data are taken from the 1980 and 1990 Census of Population and Housing. are they better off than their counterparts in 1980. The higher com- missions in Boston are simply dissipated, wasted through the entry of real estate agents seeking to earn these higher commissions, agents who could be profitably engaged in other activities. In short, this comparison of Boston and Minneapolis suggests that we look for the following three pieces of indirect evidence of socially wasteful entry by real estate agents. Specifically, if commission rates are fixed and if real estate agents dissipate higher commissions in cities with high housing costs through entry, in cities with high housing prices, we should see (1) more real estate agents (relative to the city’s labor force), (2) lower productivity (sales per agent or sales per hour worked), and (3) real wages of real estate agents that are no higher than in cities with low housing costs. In this paper, we find strong support for all three conjectures, in a cross section of 282 cities and also when considering changes across these cities from 1980 to 1990. These results also hold true when we account for part-time real estate agents. As a preview of our empirical evidence, consider the scatter plot of the change in the log productivity of an average real estate agent in a city from 1980 to 1990 against the change in the average log price of housing (fig. 1). This figure suggests that a 1 percent increase in average housing prices in a city results in 1080 journal of political economy a 0.7 percent decline in brokers’ productivity, which we interpret as indicating that 70 percent of the higher commissions in high–housing cost cities translate into social waste. However, an alternative explanation is that the higher commission in high–housing cost cities may reflect the possibility that a broker has to spend more time matching buyers and sellers in such cities. For example, expensive houses may have id- iosyncratic features. And even when differences in housing prices are entirely due to the price of land (rather than housing quality), home buyers in expensive cities may take more time searching and visit more houses before making a decision. Therefore, the correlation between housing prices and the productivity of realtors may reflect differences in the quality of the service provided by realtors. Although we cannot completely rule out this interpretation, bear in mind that the evidence presented in figure 1 considers changes over time, which abstract from permanent characteristics of cities that might also reflect the difficulty of matching buyers and sellers in a given city. In addition, we also provide four pieces of evidence that are inconsistent with this interpretation. First, we condition