Disbarment of Lawyers
Egil Krogh, Jr., was admitted [to practice] law in the state of Washington on September 20, 1968. On February 4, 1974, he was suspended as a result of his having been convicted of a felony. [Krogh now appeals the disciplinary board’s decision to disbar him.] The information referred to in the complaint charged that while the respondent was an officer and employee of the United States Government . . . and acting in his official capacity, in conjunction with others who were officials and employees of the United States Government, the defendant unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree with his co-conspirators to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Dr. Lewis J. Fielding . . . in the free exercise and enjoyment of a right and privilege secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to conceal such activities. It further charged that the co-conspirators did, without legal process, probable cause, search warrant or other lawful authority, enter the offices of Dr. Fielding in Los Angeles County, California, with the intent to search for, examine and photograph documents and records containing confidential information concerning Daniel Ellsberg, and thereby injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate Dr. Fielding in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right and privilege secured to him by the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . To all of these allegations, the respondent had pleaded guilty. Both the hearing panel and the disciplinary board found that moral turpitude was an element of the crime of which respondent was convicted. The panel found that he has a spotless record except for the incident involved in these proceedings; that he is outstanding in character and ability; that his reputation is beyond reproach; that he acted, although mistakenly, out of a misguided loyalty to [President Nixon]; that the event was an isolated one, and that in all probability there would be no repetition of any such error on his part. The panel further found that the respondent had accepted responsibility and had made amends to the best of his ability; that he testified fully and candidly and that his attitude in the proceeding was excellent. The panel concluded that in this case which it found to be distinguishable from all other cases, the respondent apparently followed the order of a “somewhat distraught President of the United States” under the guise of national security to stop by all means further security leaks. Th[e] rule [that attorneys are disbarred automatically when they are found guilty of a felony] still governs the disposition of such disciplinary proceedings in a number of jurisdictions. However, under our disciplinary rules, some flexibility is permitted, and the court retains its discretionary power to determine whether, on the facts of the particular case, the attorney should be disbarred.
We cannot accept the assumption that attorneys . . . can ordinarily be expected to abandon the principles which they have sworn to uphold, when asked to do so by a person who holds a constitutional office. Rather than being overawed by the authority of one who holds such an office . . . the attorney who is employed by such an officer should be the most keenly aware of the Constitution and all of its provisions, the most alert to discourage the abuse of power. In such a position those powers of discernment and reason, which he holds himself out as possessing, perform their most important function. If, when given a position of power himself, he forgets his oath to uphold the Constitution and laws of the land and instead [flouts] the constitutional rights of other citizens and holds himself above the law, can we say to the public that a person so weak in his dedication to constitutional principles is qualified to practice law? That the reputation and honor of the bar have suffered severe damage as a result is now a matter of common knowledge. We find it difficult to believe that the respondent was not aware, when he authorized the burglary of Dr. Fielding’s office, that if his conduct became known, it would reflect discredit upon his profession. For the reasons set forth herein, we must conclude that the respondent, in spite of his many commendable qualities and achievements, has shown himself to be unfit to practice law. The recommendation of the disciplinary board is approved, and the respondent’s name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys in this state.
1. What ethical norm is central to the court’s decision in this case?
2. What fact seems especially powerful in shaping the court’s reasoning?
3. What reasons does the court provide for upholding the respondent’s disbarment?
4. Outline the reasons why Egil Krogh, Jr., believed he should not be disbarred by the disciplinary board of the State of California.