Consider the following sequential game. There are two players, Player 1 and Player 2, who alternate turns. Each turn, each player can choose one of two actions: Across (A) or Down (D). If either...


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Consider the following sequential game. There are two players, Player 1 and Player 2,<br>who alternate turns. Each turn, each player can choose one of two actions: Across (A)<br>or Down (D). If either player chooses D on their turn, the game ends. Otherwise, it<br>becomes the other player's turn, who may again play either A or D. The game ends<br>after 100 turns for each player, if no player has played D previously.<br>Payoffs in the game are represented by the following game tree, where nodes denote<br>turns for each player, branches denote actions, and final payoffs are indicated at the<br>end of each branch (Player 1's payoff is the first number, Player 2's payoff is the<br>second):<br>100<br>98<br>98<br>97<br>100<br>99<br>99<br>101<br>Note that the sum of payoffs for each player is increasing by 1 each turn. However, a<br>player claims a slightly larger payoff if the game ends on their turn, rather than their<br>opponent's.<br>Assuming that both players strictly apply the principle of backward induction, what<br>payoffs will the players receive in this game?<br>[Hint: Start by analyzing what happens at the last decision node. Then think about the<br>second from the last, and the third from last. What pattern do you observe?)<br>198. 101)<br>(97, 100)<br>* (100, 100)<br>(1. 1)<br>(99, 99)<br>88<br>

Extracted text: Consider the following sequential game. There are two players, Player 1 and Player 2, who alternate turns. Each turn, each player can choose one of two actions: Across (A) or Down (D). If either player chooses D on their turn, the game ends. Otherwise, it becomes the other player's turn, who may again play either A or D. The game ends after 100 turns for each player, if no player has played D previously. Payoffs in the game are represented by the following game tree, where nodes denote turns for each player, branches denote actions, and final payoffs are indicated at the end of each branch (Player 1's payoff is the first number, Player 2's payoff is the second): 100 98 98 97 100 99 99 101 Note that the sum of payoffs for each player is increasing by 1 each turn. However, a player claims a slightly larger payoff if the game ends on their turn, rather than their opponent's. Assuming that both players strictly apply the principle of backward induction, what payoffs will the players receive in this game? [Hint: Start by analyzing what happens at the last decision node. Then think about the second from the last, and the third from last. What pattern do you observe?) 198. 101) (97, 100) * (100, 100) (1. 1) (99, 99) 88

Jun 10, 2022
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