Consider the finite horizon alternating offer bargaining game we studied in lecture. Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over a unit sized pie. In every odd period player 1 makes an offer of a split (a...

Extracted text: Consider the finite horizon alternating offer bargaining game we studied in lecture. Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over a unit sized pie. In every odd period player 1 makes an offer of a split (a real number between 0 and 1) to player 2. Player 2 may accept (then the game ends and the split is implemented) or reject (then the game moves to the next period). In even periods, the players' roles are reversed: player 2 makes the offer and player 1 accepts or rejects it. If an offer is accepted, then the game ends and the player's receive the agreed upon shares. If T offers are rejected, then the game ends with payoffs (0,0). Each player has a discount factor, but unlike in class, the discount factors are not the same for each player. Specifically, player 1 has discount factor d1 E (0, 1) and player 2 has discount factor d2 € (0, 1). Solve for the unique SPNE of this game.