SCR Annex A Risk Log FHA (A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(H)(I)(J)(K)(L)(M) (A)(N)(O)(P)(Q) (A)(R)(S) (T)(U)(Y)(Z)(X) ID #Function Identification Functional Assessment Hazard Description (for...

All the above scenarios’ has to update into an Excel Sheet which has been submitted to you as an additional proof/example. In that provided excel sheet has some pre-descripted examples with respect to some cases, just follow/use them as a reference to update the above following scenarios’ 1-7.

SCR Annex A Risk Log FHA (A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(H)(I)(J)(K)(L)(M)(A)(N)(O)(P)(Q)(A)(R)(S)(T)(U)(Y)(Z)(X) ID #Function IdentificationFunctional AssessmentHazard Description (for safety significant functions)Casual FactorRisk SubstantiationRisk CategoryInitial RiskHRIEnduring Mitigations (To eliminate or minimise the risk)Mitigation ResponsibilityPlanned Applied By DateResidual Risk (SFARP)HRIInterim Mitigations (As required, to eliminate or minimise the risk)Risk Level with Applied Interim Mitigations (SFARP)Design DisclosureVerificationHuman Impact FactorsSocial Impact FactorsComments FunctionSub-FunctionFunctional FailurePhase/s Safety Significant Function?LikelihoodConsequenceRisk LevelLikelihoodConsequenceRisk LevelLikelihoodConsequenceRisk Level 1ElectricalSafety componentsOther components stop workingOperational - UnattendedYesElectrical components purchased are of low quality leading to failure of critical electrical systemsLack of understanding of manufacturing process Counterfeit Parts used in manufacturing Lack of supply chain managementPrevious suppliers in this sector have provided counterfeit parts Safety reports issued on previous accidents / failuresPerformanceProbableCatastrophicVery HighE41. Elimination - Redundant Systems - Procure higher quality parts 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPEElectrical EngineersEnd of Week 2ImprobableCatastrophicMediumE21. Elimination - - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - Response processes upon failure detection - 6. PPE - - ImprobableMajorLowShop Drawings Procedures Design DocumentsAuditing Inspections TestingFatalities Family Public Perception Reputation of business and employees 2MechanicalDiesel PlantDiesel Shut off systems fail to activateOperational - Unattended, Maintenance Shutdown - AttendedYesAutomated diesel generator systems fail to activate on the disesl generators upon shutdown command being passed from operator. Lack of understanding of shutdown process Lack of system failure alerting Lack of detail in safeguards to system designPrevious notifications and defect alerts from supplier of automated systems Previous experience from designers and operatorsPerformanceOccasionalModerateLowB31. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - Engineer in a failsafe system to ensure the diesel systems shut down upon command - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPEEngineeringEnd of Week 2ImprobableModerateVery LowB21. Elimination - - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - Response processes upon failure detection - 6. PPE - - ImprobableMinorVery LowDetailed Design Documentation Procedures Testing Auditing Operational TestingOperator injuryOperator Morale and confidence in the delivered system 3ConstructionScaffoldingConstruction scaffolding fails and causes collapse with construction operators Operational - UnattendedYesScaffolding joins fail upon use past their inspection date and can cause collapse of scaffolding system. Resulting in fall from heights greater then 2.0mUse of out of date and out of inspection equipmentInspection reports suggesting prior use of equipment out of inspection dateSafetyImprobableCriticalMediumD21. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - Engineer in a failsafe system to ensure the diesel systems shut down upon command - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPESite Safety Officer Site Inspection OfficerEnd of Week 2RareMajorVery LowC11. Elimination - Utilisation of equipment that is in inspection date and serviceable 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPERareModerateVery LowTest and Inspection Log / Reports Development of inspection process Planned Maintenance ProceduresTesting InspectionFalls resulting in injury to workers and surrounding personnel Reputation of business is damaged 4Physical SecuritySite SecurityCriminal opportunity. Criminals obtain access to the worksite and theft of tools and equipment is experiencedOperational - Unattended, Maintenance Operational - Attended, Maintenance Shutdown - AttendedNoPhysical Security of the site not sufficientSecurity reports Criminal intelligence reports from local police and securityPerformanceOccasionalModerateLowB31. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - Implement Security monitoring system and fencing to protect the site - 5. Administrative Controls - Implement security procedures to guard and protect the work site 24/7 - 6. PPESite ManagerEnd of Week 2ImprobableMajorLowC21. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - 5. Administrative Controls - Implement security guards as a temporary measure until firmer security controls are implemented - 6. PPEImprobableMajorLowSite security and safety design Site Security protocolsInspection Morale impacted Productivity impacted Delays experiencedSite and company reputation impacted 5Site SecurityThreat from ProtestorsProtestors block the main entry and exit gates to the worksiteOperational - Unattended, Maintenance Operational - Attended, Maintenance Shutdown - AttendedNoProtestors and Issue Motivated Groups intent on disrupting the work site and operationsSecurity reports Criminal intelligence reports from local police and securityPerformanceImprobableMajorLowC21. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - Security system and Fencing - Security Guards - CCTV 5. Administrative Controls - Security protocols - Community engagement protocols and activities 6. PPESite Safety and Security Manager Site Manager End of Week 2 ERROR:#N/ANo residual risk identified until end of week 2 implementation Security operating processes Site security design documentsInspection Decreased morale of staff Work time lost Reputational DamageBusiness reputational damage Staff reputational damage Community discouragement Industry discouragement 6GovernmentalExternal influencersDe-scope or halting the projectNoChange of Government during project resulting in de-prioritising the programChange of Government Change of public opinion of the projectReports from Federal, State and Local Government Reports from end customerEnvironmentImprobableCriticalMediumD21. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - Implement management and monitoring through regular engagement - 6. PPEExecutive Management Project Management Business ManagementEnd of Week 2 ERROR:#N/ANo Residual risk identified Project Status reporting Inspection of reports Loss of sustained employment for staff Degrade morale of staffLoss of economical gain for local community 7Human EngineeringEnvironmental Management SystemEnvironmental management system designOperational - UnattendedYesPoor design in Submarine environmental sustainment systems resulting in lower than expected endurance and higher long term risk to operator health Poor design process System engineering process not followed Initial Statement of Requirements not followed or defined High level design not correctReports from previous designs and lessons learntSafetyProbableCatastrophicVery HighE41. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - Engineer a robust design in the Environmental Monitoring and Management system - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPEDesign EngineersEnd of Week 4ImprobableCriticalMediumD21. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - Implement strict peer review process - Implement Documentation review and analysis of design 6. PPEImprobableCriticalMediumDesign Documents Engineering Management PlanInspection TestingSignificant impact on operators if poor design is implemented short and long termReputation of business is damaged Trust of customer is damaged 8ICT SystemsOnboard ICT Networking systemICT Network failure preventing systems from communicating and passing commandsOperational - UnattendedYesICT Network infrastructure installed on the submarine constantly fails which prevents reliant systems from communicating. This also causes additional systems from functioning correctlyPoor network design Poor requirement definition Poor network componentsPrevious Submarine design reports Previous operator statements of accountSafetyOccasionalCriticalHighD31. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - Design a network that is robust and has an availability of over 99.98% - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPEICT Designers Electrical EngineersEnd of Week 3 ERROR:#N/ANo residual risk identified 9Hull PreservationPreparation and primingExposure to chemicalsOperational - UnattendedYesPreparation chemicals used in the submarine painting process pose a significant personnel, environmental and ozone risk if used incorrectly causing permanent injury with a high probability of exposed workers contracting cancerous diseases after prolonged use and exposure. ERROR:#N/A1. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPE ERROR:#N/A1. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPE 10Structural SystemHull SystemImplosion of hullOperational - UnattendedYesForged steel for submarine hull has been found to potentially develop microscopic stress fractures leading to decreased operating ability and potential catastrophic destruction of the submarine if operated within normal operating limitationsPoor design process System engineering process not followed Initial Statement of Requirements not followed or defined High level design not correctPrevious design reports on similar systems Previous reports on metal fatigueSafetyImprobableCatastrophicMediumE21. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPE ERROR:#N/A1. Elimination - 2. Substitution - - 3. Isolation - - 4. Engineering Controls - 5. Administrative Controls - - 6. PPE ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A ERROR:#N/A CLASSIFICATIONAnnex A to Safety Case Report/Technical Risk Assessment &8SOP (LSD) 12-0-110 TP03 v3.0CLASSIFICATION Page &P of &NObjective File Reference Modems-IF (A)(B)(C)(D)(E)(F)(G)(H)(I) Hazard IDHazard DescriptionEffect of HazardRisk AssessmentRecommended Actions - HIRAC (Enduring mitigations to achieve SFARP and interim mitigation if required)Actions Applied By Who:Actions Applied By Date:Effect of Recommeded ActionsStatus Risk SubstantiationLikelihoodConsequenceRiskHRIIs the Risk assessed as SFARP when ALL Mitigations Agreed have been implemented?Residual Risk (SFARP)Concession or OtherDescription of Risk at Date of Signature LikelihoodConsequenceRiskHRI MS-001Environmental impactEnvironmental ImpactThe likelihood is XXX because: - - Consequence is assessed as XXX due: - - Red Team: Red Team: - Comment is place holder needs to be udpated. - Current information in orginal Phar table and AECOM report is defficient is documenation risk substantationUnlikely Red Team: Red Team: These are assumptions only to derive the risk as identified in the AECOM Chair 1 report. No Likelihood and Consequence data was provided in the reportModerate Red Team: Red Team: These are assumptions only to derive the risk as identified in the AECOM Chair 1 report. No Likelihood and Consequence data was provided in the reportERROR:#REF!ERROR:#REF!Fuel room, fill point & generator plant to be bunded - consider bunding to meet standards. Consider requirements for pipework to mitigate risk of leakage. Small pipework distance. Note diesel pipework above ground - consider trip hazards, access, maintainability etcYesUnlikelyMinorERROR:#REF!ERROR:#REF!Implementation of the identified actions means the risk is reduced to XXX The consequence remains as XXX. Other considerations: - - - Red Team: Red Team: - Comment is place holder needs to be udpated, inncluding summary of other consideration as per the DID Red Team: Red Team: - Comment is place holder needs to be udpated. - Current information in orginal Phar table and AECOM report is defficient is documenation risk substantation Red Team: Red Team: These are assumptions only to derive the risk as identified in the AECOM Chair 1 report. No Likelihood and Consequence data was provided in the report Red Team: Red Team: These are assumptions only to derive the risk as identified in the AECOM Chair 1 report. No Likelihood and Consequence data was provided in the reportOpen Subsystem Key MR - FDMA EBEM Modem Racks