4. Provide a short answer to the questions below. a) Consider table 2 below where the normal form of a simultaneous gameis shown. Find all dominated strategies and point out the Nash equilibrium(s)....

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Extracted text: 4. Provide a short answer to the questions below. a) Consider table 2 below where the normal form of a simultaneous gameis shown. Find all dominated strategies and point out the Nash equilibrium(s). Table 2: Left MiddleRight Up Down 5,5 4,3 2,7 0,4 5,-1 -4,-2 b) Consider a teacher and student. The student is expected to get 80(out of 100) from an upcoming assignment. The teacher gets a utility of 3 if the student turns in the assignment on time. If the student turns in the assignment late, he thinks he can increase his grade to 90. If the assignment is turned in late, the teacher's utility falls to 1. Assume that the teacher can implement a grading penalty (i.e. -50 points) for late turn-ins. How would you model this interaction and what should be the penalty set by the teacher?