1 Generally, economic decisions can be carried out through private choice(ie through markets) or public choice(ie through government) Discuss Adam Smith’s view of the market process, particularly...

1 Generally, economic decisions can be

carried out through private choice(ie through markets) or public choice(ie

through government) Discuss Adam Smith’s view of the market process,

particularly his view on the role of self-interest Then , briefly explain

Hayek’s argument in “the use of knowledge in Soiety,”and friedman’s thoughts

about economic and political freedom What do these ideas imply for the

relative efficiency of government vs market decision-making?

2 Compare and contrast the various theories

of the origin of government discussed by Gordon(1976), including the

theoretical work of Rawls, Buchanan, and Nozick Make specific references both

to what is similar across their approaches, and what is different in their

conclusions Why are these theories all “contractarian” in nature?

3 Traditional public finance

identifies (at least) three major sources of market failure ( public goods,

externalities, and asymmetric information) Briefly define each, and explain

the deviation from ideal economic efficiency Then, discuss the possible

solutions to each type of market failure proposed by traditional public finance

theory Finally, making references to Buchanan and Tullock, discuss the

fundamental differences in approach between public choice and traditional

public finance

4 Discuss constitutional political

economy as a research program, referencing its relationship to public choice

and more traditional economics What does Buchanan(1990) view as the main

distinction(s) between constitutional economics and more traditional economics?

Then discuss holcombe’s (1991,1992,1998) work on American constitutional

history as it relates to constitutional political economy

5 A fundamental question in public

choice asks why voters vote Explain the rational voter hypotheses as explained

by downs and some of its extensios Then, discuss tullock’s “charity of the

uncharitable” and how it relates

6 Explain fully arrow’s impossibility

theorem , paying particular attention to the ideal conditions discussed by

arrow What is arrow’s fundamental conclusion, and what does it imply for

discussions of social welfare functions or optimal decision rules? Discuss

examples of outcomes from other voting models(eg vote cycles, median voter,

agenda control)in terms of how they coincide with Arrow’s result

7 Discuss, using graphs, the Buchanan

and Tullock approach to identifying the optimal voting/decision rule What are

the costs involved in reaching a collective decision? How does the type of

decision(eg constitutional design vs post-constitutional period)affect the

optimal voting rule? How does wicksell’s (1896) view on unanimity relate?

Provide real-world examples of different voting/decision rules, being sure to

discuss them in terms of the costs described by Buchanan and Tullock

8 The median voter theorem is one of

the most well-known contributions to the public choice theory of voting

Explain the model fully, being sure to discuss its primary conclusions(in terms

of what factor(s) determine political outcomes)as well as the critical

assumptions What happens to the likelihood of observing stable voting outcomes

if these assumptions are violated? What possible explanations have been offered

in the literature to explain the relative stability of observed political

outcomes (eg Tullock, Romer andRosenthal)?

9 Explain fully the “law of 1/n”: what

phenomenon are weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen attempting to explain? What role

does geography play in their theory? In what way do political actors view costs

differently, according to the authors? Why specifically, does legislature size

matter? Finally, explain some of the theoretical extensions building upon this

article

10 Discuss the literature on electoral

accountability, being with Besley and Case(1995) Why , specifically, does

looking at term limits provide insight into electoral accountability? How does

the approach of smart and Sturm(2013)? Finally, discuss soe theoretical and

empirical extensions following this work

?